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1  Introduction 
How do wages affect the incentives for labor prodllctivity enhancing innova-
tion at the industry level? We address this qllestion by st'udying the evollltion 
of prodllctivity growth in a competitive indllstry.  Firms in this industry face 
an exogenolls wage rate, which can be thought of as being determined in the 
aggregate labor market of the lillderlying economy.  This wage  affects  the 
innovative performance of the industry as  firms  seek  to  reduce their labor 
cost by increasing labor productivity.  The dynamics of innovation converge 
to a uniqlle steady state, in which  lmit labor costs are constant over  time. 
In the steady state, the munber of active firms,  their supply and unit labor 
cost tllrn out not to depend on the level of wages;  they only depend on their 
rate of growth.  Prom any initial configuration the indllstry characteristics 
monotonically approach the steady state as  time evolves.  Along the adjllst-
ment path, high but declining productivity growth rates are associated with 
entry of new firms and a decline in the size of firms.  Exit induces an increase 
in market concentration when prodllctivity growth is  relatively low  bllt in-
creasing over time. 
Technological innovations as a means to reduce labor costs seem to have 
been at the heart of economic  growth for  many decades.  Our theoretical 
argument is  in  the same spirit as  the empirical findings  of Gordon  (1987) 
who arglles that a substantial component of accelerations and decelerations  ' 
of productivity growth in Europe, Japan and the U.S.  can be attributed to 
the behavior of the ratio of wages to labor productívity.  A nllmber of micro- .. 
econometric studies have established a positive relationship between wages 
and the introdllction of new technologies.  The time series results of Doms, 
Dunne and Troske (1997) suggest that plants with high wage workforces are 
more likely to adopt new technologies.  A possible explanation for  this could 
be sorne  complementarity between  technology  and skill:  Wages  are  posi-
tively related to workforce skills  and these skills allow  new  technologies  to 
be adopted at lower costs.  The alternative rationalization, which we  model 
in this paper, is that higher wages will induce firms to substitllte away from 2 
..￿ 
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of firms  and entry and exit over the product life  cycle.
2  For simplicity, om 
study disregards firm heterogeneity and stochastic factors that may affect in-
novation.  The indllstry variables monotonically approach their steady state 
values; entry and exit never occur simultaneollsly along the adjustment path. 
The remainder of  the paper is organized as  follows.  Seetion 2 presents a 
stylized model of a competitive indllstry.  Section 3 describes  its short-rlln 
equilibrillm.  The main reslllts are contained in Section 4,  which studies the 
industry's long-run behavior.  The final  Seetion offers  conclllding remarks. 
The reslllts of Sections 3 and Section 4 employ a series of Lemmas that are 
relegated to an Appendix. 
The Model 
The model depkts the evollltion of a competitive indllstry with free  entry 
and exit. The firms produce a homogeneous good and take the market clear-
ing price as fixed.  Similarly, they behave competitively in the labor market 
by  considering  the wage _rate  as  exogenolls.  Time is  discrete and at each 
date there is a sufficiently large number of producers who have access to the 
cnrrent technology.  Producers become active at date t  by  investing capital 
and engaging in process innovation to increase labor prodllctivity.  At date 
t + 1 they employ  labor to produce Olltput.  Given the intertemporal path  . 
of wages,  the evollltion  of the industry is  determined  by  the active firms' 
innovation behavior becallse this generates  the available technology at the 
next date.  .. 
Formally, the model is specified as follows.  To  produce x lUutS of 611tput 
_￿  at date t +1, a firm has to invest the amollnt e(x) +f at date t. ThllS there is 
a fixed cost f > O and the variable capacity cost is C(x). Production occurs 
at date t + 1 and requires  the labor input x/at+t, where  at+t  is  the firm's 
labor productivity at t + lo 
2See, e.g. , Hopenhayn (1992),  Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994)  and Klepper (1996). 
Pakes and Ericson (1995)  address this question in an imperfectly competitive industry. •  ···---~'~'·~--~--~-·'····-···_""  '  ••_.. '"  lt'iiIl5PIIIII.~. •• 'A,"  ••,.-.w'_-_._-_..._~-_ ....,-------~ .....,._._ .. t_... t""'_"".'M .....
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We denote the total mass of active firms at date t by nt. In each period, 
the industry faces  the (inverse)  demand flll1ction  P(·)  so  t.hat  P(x)  is  the 
market clearing price for  the aggregate supply x.  The assumption that de-
mand is stationary over time is not essential for om analysis.  We discuss this 
issue below in Section 4. 
We  maintain the following  assumpt.ions on  the flmctions  K (.), C (.)  and 
P(·): Inverse demand sat.isfies P(O)  =  P > O,  P' < Oand P(oo)  =  O. The cost 
fllnct.ions  satisfy K(O)  =  O, K'(O)  =  O, K'(q)  > O, K"(q)  > O for  all  q >  O, 
and C(O)  =  O, C'(O)  =  O, C'(x) > O, C"(x) > O for  all  x > O.  Moreover,  let 
K(q)  ~ 00 as q ~  00 and C(x)/x ~ 00 as  x ~  oo.  In addition we  require 
that 
K"(  ) > K'(q)2  C"(x) > 2[C'(x)x - C(x)].  (4) q  - 2K(q)'  - x2 
Thus, the cost fllnctions are assmned to be sllfficiently convex in order to 
avoid problems wit.h nonconvexit.ies that. typically arise in {l&D mo_dels  (see, 
e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)).  It. is easy to see that by the first. inequal-
ity in (4)  the elasticity oft.he marginal innovation cost K'  (q)  is at least twice 
the elasticity of t.he  cost  K(q).  Similarly,  the second inequality is  identical 
to assmning that.  the elasticit.y of the difference bet.ween  the marginal cost, 
C'(x), and the average cost, C(x) / x,  is at least one.  Assumpt.ion (4)  is sat.is-
fied for instance for  K(q) =  ¡<¡,qCl.  and C(x) = xxf3  as long as a  2: 2 and (J  2:  2. 
Finally,  to ensure t.hat  the problem is  non-trivial,  we  add the follo:wing 
assllmption: 
¡:_  •  [C(X) + f]  (5) up>mm
x2:0  x 
That is, demand is sufficiently high so that sorne producers are active when-
ever the wage rate is small enough. '. 
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labor through new technologies.  Chennells and Van Reenen (1997)  conclude 
from  their analysis of British plant data that this substitution effect  may 
indeed be important factor.  In a dynamic factor demand model, Mohnen et. 
al.  (1986) find that the long - run cross-price elasticity of R&D with respect 
to the price of labor is  fairIy  large.  Also  Flaig and Stadler (1994)  conclude 
from  their estimatiop. of a dynamic model of innovation behavior that the 
wage rate seems to be a major determinant for process innovations. 
The impact of labor market conditions on  productivity appears impor-
tant for understanding the innovative performance of different industries and 
countries. While om analysis emphasizes the role of higher wages in creating 
substitution away  from  labor that boosts productivity,  other studies have 
been concerned with the impact of unions on wages  and innovation.  Rere 
the conventional wisdom follows  Grout's (1984) argmnent that the union will 
appropriate sorne share of the rents from  technological improvements.  This 
tends to reduce the firm's incentive to innovate.1  Our model abstracts from 
these issues by considering wages at the indllstry level as exogenous.  The sim-
plest theoretical justification for  this is that the industry forms a small part 
of an economy in which the aggregate market for labor can be represented by 
a standard competit.ive model.  Yet, our main insights do not necessarily rely 
on the competitive labor market paradigrn.  Our analysis shows  that noto  the 
level  of wages  but t.heir  growth rate is  important for  long-run productivity 
growth.  Therefore, the possible presence of industry wage different.ials does  ' 
U9-.taffect om results as long as  the time path of the industry's wage follows 
the same trend as  the cornpetitive wage.  ~ 
The partial equilibrium dynamics  of a competitive indust.ry  have been 
studied first by Lucas and Prescott (1971).  Since then, a number of models 
.  has been developed that focus on innovation Imder technological IIDcert.ainty 
in a competitive industry.  These models investigate the stochastic evolution 
1A short outline of the rent-sharing argwnent together with an empírica! analysís can 
be  found in Van Reenen (1996).  Ulph and Ulph  (1994)  present a model with different 
conclusions. 7￿ 
n; solve Pt+l = P(n;xn. As P(.) is strietly decreasing, the solution is unique 
with n; > O.  We now claim that (q;, x; ,nn is  the unique static eqlúlibrium 
for  the wage-productivity ratio  Ct.  As  (q;, xn minimizes  the average  cost 
<p(·ICt), it also ma."<.imizes a firm's profits for given Pt+l  and thus condition (i) 
of the definition of the static equilibrium is satisfied.  Further, by definition 
of Pt+l  a fum makes zero profits (condition (ii)).  Final1y, by the definition of 
n;, the market clears (condition (iii)).  Suppose next that Pt+l  ~  p.  In this 
case, n;x; > Oimplies negative profits for  aH active firms.  Hence, the unique 
static equilibrium is n; =  q;  = x;  =  O. 
To  prove  the second part, note first  that <p( q;, x; ICt)  is  strictly increas-
ing in Ct  by the Envelope Theorem.  Further, <p(q;, x;ICt)  > C(x;)/x; Thus, 
by Lemma 11  in the Appendix,  <p(q;, x;lct)  - 00 as  Ct  - oo.  Further,  by 
(5),  <p(q;, x;  lO)  < 6p.  ThllS,  by continllity of <p(.),  there exists a esuch that 
<p(q;,x;lc)  =  6p.  By the aboye argument, n; > Oif and only if Ct  < c.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 establishes a unique static equilibrillm for eaeh wage - pro-
dllCtivity ratio. If the wage rate is  too high or the productivity of labor too 
low, then no firm enters the market becallse - even at the efficient seale - aver-
age costs exceed the chock-off price P(O). If,  however, the wage-prodllctivity 
ratio is low enollgh, assllmption (5)  ensures that a positive measure of firms 
operates in the market.  Firms choose their R&D expenditures such that their 
marginal benefit from  the higher labor prodllctivity tomorrow eqllals their  j 
margip.al cost of innovation.  Further, as firms  are price takers, they choose 
the output level such that their marginal cost eqllals the market price.  In ad-
Jo 
dition, free entry in the indllstry implies that the fums' average cost is eqllal 
to the market price, and henee to their marginal costo  As a consequenc~j  it is 
as if each firm were minimizing its average costs in eqlÚlibrium.  Given that 
.  a  firm's  average cost  is  strictly convex in outPllt and R&D expenditures, 
there is  a uniqlle ontpllt and innovation level that minimizes these costs for 
each wage-prodllctivity ratio; moreover, the minimum average cost, and thus 
the market price, is  lmique.  Finally, the number of firms  adjusts such that 
demand equals supply.  As demand is strictly decreasing, the number of firms 4￿ 
Each potential producer observes  the process innovations performed by 
the active firms.  As Klepper (1996), we assume that after one period he can 
costlessly incorporate these innovations into rus  own  technology.  Thus an 
active firm has a one-period monopoly over the technological improvements 
generated by its R&D activity in period t.  We  focus  on labor productivity 
enhancing process innovation and assume that each firm can increase current 
productivity by the factor  (1 + q)  by investing the amount K(q).  Thus, if 
at describes the most advanced technology developed at date t - 1,  a firm's 
labor prodllctivity at t + 1 is 
(1) 
if it invests the amollnt K (q)  in process innovation. 
The exogenolls  wage  rate Wt  grows  at the rate ,  > Oso  that Wt+l  = 
(1 + ,)Wt, with Wo  > O.  One possible interpretation is that ,  represents the 
average growth rate of labor prodllctivity in the entire economy.  Therefore, 
also wages grow at the rate ,  in the eqnilibrillm of the economy - wide labor 
market. 8ince the indllstry lmder consideration constitutes only a small part 
of the whole economy, its impact on the eqllilibrillm wage rate can be taken 
to be negligible.3 
Let Ct = wt/at. Then, after investing K(q) at date t, the firm's labor cost 
per mlÍt of outPllt at the next date is 
1 +,  i("2)
Ct+ 1 = 1 + q Ct· 
The firm sells its Olltput at the price Pt+l. Given the common discollnt factor 
, O< 8 S 1, its present value of profit is 
1 +,] I1(q, Xlpt+l, Ct) = 8  Pt+l - Ct-- x - K(q) - C(x) - f.  (3) [  l+q 
3As  we  indicated in the Introduction, the industry's wage rate Wt does not have to be 
identical to the competitive wage rateo  If Wt  represents the competitive wage  rate, then 
our analysis remains valid as long as there is an a  > Osuch that Wt =aWt. 
I --------------
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wage-productivity ratio.  In other words,  an increase in the unit labor cost 
raises  the minimum efficiency scale,  at which  firms  operate in  a free  entry 
equilibrium.  Furthermore, since the minimmn average cost is higher when a 
firm faces  higher wages or its labor productivity is  lower,  the market clears 
at a higher price and total demand is  reduced.  Since bigger firms  serve a 
smaller total demand,  the number of active firms  in the market is  smaller 
when the wage-productivity ratio is  higher. 
Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that innovative investments are higher in 
a smaller,  more concentrated market.5  Yet,  this  observation does  not im-
ply a  causal relationship since  innovation,  firm  size  and industry size  are 
simultaneously determined.  Another implication of Proposition 3 is  that, as 
the wage-productivity ratio increases, aggregate employrnent in the industry 
decreases because indllstry ontpnt shrinks.  As a res1l1t,  higher prodllctivity 
growth and lower aggregate employment are observed in the industry.6  Note 
however  that,  as  the size  of firms  increases,  employment at the firm  level 
may increase or decrease with the wage-prodllctivity ratio.  There is no clear 
relationship between prodnctivity growth and employrnent at the plant level. 
4  Equilibrium Dynamics 
We now turn to the dynamics of innovation.  In the previolls Section it was  I 
shown how the state variable Ct  affects the indllstry eqllilibrillm in period t. 
As  part of this equilibrillm, the rate of prodllctivity growth q;  is  a ftlllction 
of Ct.  Since q;  determines the change in the state variable from period f¡: to 
t+ 1, the industry's dynamics are generated by the evolution of Ct. The indlls-
try starts in period t =  Ofrom the exogenollsly given labor productivity ao. 
.  Since the wage rate in this period is wo, the initial value of the state variable 
5For  our model, it would seem natural to regard l/nt as  a measure of the degree of 
concentration. 
6This observation is  in line with the model of Bean and Pissarides  (1993)  where an 




3  Static Equilibrium 
First, we  consider  the industry equilibrium at a  particular date t.  At this 
date,  the wage  rate Wt  together with the labor productivity at  determine 
the current wage-productivity ratio Ct. This parameter describes the state of 
the industry at date t.  Of comse,  Ct depends on the evolution of wages and 
productivity in the past.  Yet, in this Section we focus  on the static aspects 
of firm behavior and consider Ct  as exogenolls. 
Definition  (q;, x;, n; ICt)  is a static equilibrium if 
(i)  (q;,xn maximizes II(q, Xlpt+l' cd  ifn; > O;  and q;  =  x; =  Oifn; =  O; 
(ii)￿  II(q;,x;lpt+l,cd  =  Oifn; > O;  and II(q,xlpt+l,cd:::;  O for  aH  (q,x)  if 
n;  =  O; 
(iii)￿ Pt+l  =  P(n;xn o 
At date t,  a  total mass  of n;  firms  enters  the market to produce some 
Olltpllt at t + 1. Since aH firms are identical, they choose the same outPllt x; 
and innovation rate q; o  The first eqlúlibrillm reqlúrement is  that the firms 
behave competitively by taking the market price Pt+l  as fixed when choosing 
x;  and q;  so as to maximize profit.  With free  entry, profits cannot be posi-
tive.  Condition (ii)  states that each firm earns zero profit when the mass of  I 
activeji..!ffis is _positive.  Otherwise, profits may be negative.  Finally, as total 
Olltput at date t +1 is n;x;, the third equilibrium condition ensures that the 
market clears at the price Pt+lo 
~ 
Proposition 1  For each Ct  there is a unique static equilibrium (q; ,x;, n;  !ct). 
Moreover,  there is  a e> Osuch that n; > Oif and  only if  Ct < c. 
Proof:  Let (q;, x;)  be the argmin of <p(qt, xtlct)  (see  (9)  in the Appendix). 
By Lemma 10 in the Appendix, (q; 1 xn is unique since <p is strictly convex in 
(qt,Xt).  Define Pt+l = <p(q;,x;lct)/c5. Sllppose first that Pt+l  < P(O)  =  po  Let S'· 
11 
and only if e< c.  It follows  from  Lernma 11 in the Appendix that q(e)  =  I 
and e< eif and only if llies below sorne positive upper bound ;:y.  Q.E.D. 
A steady state equilibrimn is feasible only if the growth rate of wages is 
low  enough so  that the industry can afford  to match it with labor saving 
innovations. If  this is  not the case, the evolntion of productivity willlag be-
hind the growth of wages and so average costs increase over time.  Ultimately, 
this will drive the industry towards extinction as  we show in Proposition 8 
below.  We  will first  deal with the more interesting case  where I  < ;:y.  The 
following result shows that in this situation the time path of the indnstry will 
eventually approach the steady state, independently of the initial conditions. 
Proposition 5  11 there  is  a steady state,  it is  stable.  That is,  as  long  as 
I  <;:Y,  the  equilibrium sequence (q;,x;,n;lcnt  converges  to  (q,x,iJ,lc)  in the 
limit as t  -+ oo. 
Proof: By Lemma 12 in the Appendix, q; < r if e; < eand q; > I  if e; > c. 
By (6)  this implies 
(7) 
Lemma 13  in combination with (6) shows  that C;+l  increases with c;.  This  , 
together with (7)  yields 
~8) 
This proves that the sequence (c;)t  converges.  By (6),  therefore, q; -: I  so 
that c; -+ c.  By Proposition 1 and a simple continuity argument this implies 
that the equilibrimn sequence converges to the steady state.  Q.E.D. 
Over  time,  productivity growth converges  to  the rate of wage  growth. 
Thus, the steady increase in real  wages determines the firms'  persistent en-
gagement in labor productivity enhancing innovations.  Another important 
implication of the aboye result is that the long-mn behavior of the industry 
t ñtN«nn!fYl'g 8 
is uniqllely determined in equilibrillm. 
Proposition 2  Let (q;, x;, n; ICt)  be  a static equilibrium.  When  Ct  < c,  the 
rate  01 produetivity growth q;  increases with the  wage-productivity ratio Ct. 
Proof: This follows  iÍnmediately from Lemma 3 in the Appendix.  Q.E.D. 
Higher labor costs per unit of output create a stronger incentive to sub-
stitute away from labor through prodllctivity enhancing innovation.  This is 
simply so  becallse firms choose their R&D expenditures to equate the mar-
ginal benefit from  the increase  in labor productivity to  the marginal cost 
of innovation.  As  the marginal benefit of innovation is  proportional to the 
current wage-productivity ratio,  the firm's  optimal R&D expenditures are 
higher when the current wage is higher, or the current labor productivity is 
10wer.4 
Proposition 3  Let (q;, x;, n; Ict)  be  a static equilibrium.  VVhen  Ct  < C,  each 
firm 's  output  Xt  increases  with  Ct.  The  total  mass  01  active  firms  n;  and 
aggregate  industry output n;x; strictly decrease  with Ct. 
Proof: The first statement follows irnmediately froro Lernma 3 in the Appen- ~ 
dix.  By Lernma 1, óP(n;x;) = cp(q;, X;lct).  Since by the Envelope Theorem, 
cp(q;,x;lct)  is  strictly increasing in ct-;this implies that n;x; decreases with 
Ct.  As a consequence of the first statement, also n; decreases with Ct.  Q.E~"D. 
The rate of innovation and the level of output are complements for a" profit 
,￿  maximizing firmo  Intlútively, the total gain from a given reduction in lmit la-
bor costs increases with the number of goods prodnced.  As we know already 
from Proposition 2,  the higher the wage-prodllctivity ratio, the higher is the 
firm's innovation rateo  Accordingly,  also Olltpllt  is  positively related to the 
4See  the first order conditions (15)  in the AppendL'<. - -
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=￿ is  Co  Co = wo/áo.  We consider the parameter Co  as  exogenolls and assume 
t.hat it Hes below the critical value cspecified in Proposition 1 so that no > O. 
Definition  (q;,x;,n;/c;)t is  an equilibrium sequence if,  for  aH  t = 0,1, ... , 
(q;, x;, n;¡c;)  is a static equilibrium and 
*  1+, *  'h  - ct+1 = --c t ,  Wlt  Co = co,  (6)
1 +  q; 
It foHows immediately from Proposition 1 that for any Co  the equilibrium 
path of the indllstry is  flllly  determined.  We are especially interested in the 
long-mn behavior of the indllstry.  Therefore, we look at the equilibrillm out-
come for  large vallles of the time index t and investigate whether eventually 
the market will become stationary.  The indllstry will be in a steady state if 
the number of active firms,  their Olltput and their innovation efforts remain 
constant over time. 
Definition  (q,5;, nlc) is a steady state if it is a static eqllilibrimn and q= ,. 
In a steady state, the state variable remains at the vallle ebecanse wages 
and labor prodllctivity grow at the same rateo  As a reslllt, also the munber of 
active firms  and their outPllt do not change over  time.  Notice that, if there 
is a steady state, it is independent of the initial value Co of the state variable. 
Instead the steady state enoogenously  determines  the wage  - produGtivity 
ratio c.  Also,  the definition of a steady state implicitly preslunes that n,  >-. O. 
This follows immediately from the static eqllilibrÍlun condition (i) and, > O. 
Proposition 4  There is a 1 > O sueh  that a steady state (q, x, n,1 e)  exists if 
and only if, < 1.  Moreover,  if there is a steady state, it is unique. 
Proof:  Since n >  O,  Lernma  9 in  the Appendix implies  that rp(¡,xlc)  ~ 
rp(q,xlc)  for  aH  (q,x). By Lernma 12 there is  a unique esllch that this con-
dition is satisfied.  By Proposition 1 there is  thus a (uniqlle) steady state if 
1￿ 13 
Again,  the intuition for  this observation comes  from  Proposition 2.  A 
higher rate of prodllctivity growth can be sllpported only when higher unit 
labor costs  force  the firms  to speed  up innovation.  In  combination with 
Proposition 3,  this implies that the steady state size of firms  increases with 
"(.  As a result of an increase in "(,  a smaller nllmber of firms  operates in the 
indllstry producing a: lower level of aggregate Olltput. 
We finally characterize the dynamic path of the industry. 
Proposition 7  Let"( < i. Then the  equilibrium sequence (q;, x;, 11,; Icnt  sat-
isfies 
. 
Proof: By the proof of Proposition 5, the eqllilibrillm seqllence satisfies (8). 
This in c.ombination with Propositions 2 and 3 proves the statement of the 
Proposition.  Q.E.D. 
. 
The industry monotonically approaches the steady state eqll.ilibrium.  De-
pending on  the initial state,  the adjustment process exhibits  either accel-
erations or  decelerations  of productivity growth.  Changes in prodllctivity 
growth are positively related wlth changes in firm size.  Exit occurs in combi-
nation with relatively low bllt increasing rates of productivity growth.  Along 
this path, the industry adjusts to a higher level of lmit labor costs; total pro-
dllction and aggregate employrnent decrease while the outPllt price increases. 
In contrast, new firms  enter when the indllstry approaches a lower level of 
unit labor costs.  In this case,  the industry's production increases and the 
Olltpllt price declines over time. 
• 
The literature on industrial dynamics associates a 'shakeout' in the num-
ber of producers with the maturity phase in the industry's product life cycle. 
....~--------------;---------------_._-----12￿ 
is independent of its initial productivity ao  and the level of the wage rate wo. 
As time evolves, the indllstry's innovative efforts adjust labor productivity in 
such a way that it becomes proportional to the wage rate by the factor l/c. 
The basic intlútion for this phenomenon is derived in Proposition 2.  The in-
centives for innovation are positively related to the wage-prodllctivity ratio. 
This ratio reaches its'steady state level when productivity and wages grow at 
the same rateo  Above this level it induces productivity to grow faster than 
wages.  The opposite happens when unit costs  are below  the steady state 
value.  As  a result, the endogenous pace of technical progress always moves 
the wage-productivity ratio towards the steady state. 
In the long-mn, the initial state of the industry becomes irrelevant not 
only for  Ct  but also for qt, Xt and nt. These variables tend towards their steady 
state vallles,  which are independent of ao  and Wo.  The level of wages,how-
ever, has a profound impact on the employrnent of labor.  As eis a constant, 
a  one percent increase in  the level  of wages  raises  also  the long-mn level 
of labor prodnctivity by one percent.  At the same time, the level  of wages 
does not affect total industry output in the steady state.  As an implication, 
employrnent falls  by one percent.  In other words,  the long-run elasticity of 
employment with respect to the wage level eqllals minns llnity. 
In the long - mn, it is not the level of wages but the growth rate of wages 
which determines the indnstry's unit labor costo  As the following Proposition 
shows, the latter is  positively related to the growth rate of wages. 
.. 
Proposition 6  In  the  steady state (q, X, fl.lc)  the  wage  - productivity ratio e 
increases with ¡. 
Proof: Let¡' < ¡I/ andlet (¡', x', n'ld) and (¡I/,xl/, nI/Id') bethecorrespond-
ing steady states. 811ppose e'  ~  el/. Then Proposition 2 implies that ¡'  ~ ¡I/, 
a contradiction.  Q.E.D. 15￿ 
But, p does not infiuence q, Xand c. Employment either increases or decreases 
over time depending on p being larger or smaller than 'Y. 
5  Concluding Remarks 
Technical  progress  and a  substantial  increase  in  real  wages  are  main  at-
tributes of the growth process in the advanced industrial nations.  Our analy-
sis presents a cost-push argument of productivity growth.  The basic idea is 
that firms  adjust their innovative activity to increasing labor costs.  Higher 
labor costs create stronger incentives for  process innovations that raise the 
productivity of labor.  The more interesting isslle,  however,  is  the dynamic 
interaction between innovation and productivity.  As cmrent innovations aim 
at redllcing the firms' labor cost,  they also  affect  their future incentives for 
inventive activities.  Our analysis shows that long - run productivity growth 
at the industry level is  driven by the growth rate of wages.  This rate deter-
mines the number of active firms,  their labor costs per unit of output, the 
size of firms and the industry's output in the long -runo  While these variables 
are independent of the level of the wage rate, the latter determines the level 
of labor prodllctivity and employment  ~ithin  the indllstry. 
The industry's adjustment path exhibits either entry or exit of firms.  In 
contrast with a number of recent studies on indllstry dynamics, we ignore sto-
chastic factors that induce fum heterogeneity.  Yet, this restriction is  mainly 
motivated by simplicity.  In principIe,  OUL model could be enFiched by a sto-
chastic process so  that entry and exit occur simultaneously.  ~ 
Another interesting extension of om model  is  the consideration of im-
perfect competition.  A Cournot or Bertrand framework could address the 
question of how strategic interactions between the fums affect productivity 
growth in the short - nm and in the long - nm.  Stimulated by the work of 
Schumpeter (1947),  a large part of the literature on R&D relates the pace 
of innovative activity to market structure.  An imperfect competition ver-
sion of our model could combine this approach with our cost-push argnment. 
....._----------------,---------14￿ 
As  an empirical regularity of this phase (see,  e.g.,  Gort and Klepper (1982) 
and Klepper (1996)),  the munber of producers steadily declines while their 
output increases.  AIso,  the firms'  efforts to improve the production process 
increase over  time.  Proposition 7 refiects  these regularities when  Ca  <  C. 
This pararneter consteHation might apply to an industry in whkh previous 
technological breakthroughs have lead to a high productivity level.  Once the 
industry matures, the process of innovation becomes more predictable and is 
driven mainly by continuous technological improvements. 
Given  the initial state COI  exit occurs  when wages  grow  relatively fasto 
Indeed, as we indicated aboye,  the industry will not be able reach a steady  _ 
state when ¡  exceeds  the criticallevel 1. In this situation, the exit process 
eventually eliminates the entire industry. 
Proposition 8  Let (q;, x;, n; IC;)t  be  an equilibrium sequence.  JI ¡  > 1, then 
there is a finite T  > O such that n; =  Olar all t 2: T. 
Proof:  Suppose nr>  0_ for  aH  finite T.  Then the proof of Proposition 5 
implies that c; converges to sorne  C.  By Proposition 4, e> C.  By Proposition 
1 this implies n; = ofor  t  sufficiently large,  a contradiction.  Since nT =  O 
implies O= q;  < ¡, one has c;  > CT  for  aH  t  > T.  Therefore n; = Ofor  aH 
t  > T.  Q.E.D.  1, 
It is  worth noting that in our model  the-@mand flmction  P(·) has no 
effect on how  qt,  Xt  and Ct  are determined along the industry's equilibrHim 
path. It only affects the number nt of active firms,  which adjusts to equate 
demand and supply.  Thus,  stationarity of demand  is  not essential  feir  our 
"￿  analysis.  Implicitly, stationarity presumes that the growth of wages  and in-
come in the economy does not affect industry demando  This could be justified 
by assuming that demand is  derived from quasi-linear utility functions.  If, 
however, demand does change over time, our analysis can easily be modified 
to take this into account.  For instance, when demand grows  at the rate p, 
then in the steady state also the number of active firms grows at the rate p. 
1￿ ..￿ 
16￿ 
Also, it would allow studying the impact of unionization on innovation.  Rent 
sharing is likely to depress the short -run incentives for innovation.  Yet, our 
results lead to the conjecture that lmionizat.ion will not infiuence long - run . 
productivity growth,  unless wage  bargaining affects  not only the level  but 





tp(q, xlc)  = & 11 +, + K(q) + C(x) + f.  (9) +q  x 
Thus tp(q, xlc)  is the firm's average costo 
Lemma 9  Let  (qt, Xt, ntlct)  be  a static  equilibrium.  Jf nt  > O,  then  (qt, Xt) 
minimizes tp(q, x/ct).  Moreover,  ÓPt+l  =  tp(qt, Xt ICt). 
Proof: By equilibrium condition (ii),  ÓPt+l  =  tp(qt, Xt/ct).  Suppose there ex-
ists (q',x')  such that tp(q',x'lct)  < tp(qt,xtlCt).  Then I1(q',X'lpt+l,Ct)  > 0= 
II(qt, Xtlpt+l, Ct).  This yields a contradiction to condition (i).  Q.E.D. 
Lemma 10  The function tp(q, xlc)  is strictly convex in (q, x) for  all (q, x) > 
O. 
Proof: We have 
2&(1 + ')')  K"(q)  K'(q) 
(10) tpqq =  (1 + q)3  + -x- > O,  tpqx  = -----;2' 
and 
_  2(K(q) + 1)  C"(X)X2+ 2C(x) - 2C'(x)x  O  ("11)
tpxx  - 3  +  3  > .  . x  x 
This implies 
2  K"(q)2K(q) - K'(q)2  > 
tpxxtpqq - tpqX  >  4 _  O.  (12) 
X 
By the ineqllalities in (la) - (12), tp(q, xlc)  is strictly convexo  Q.E.D. .' 
18￿ 
Lemma 11  Let (q(e),x(e))  minimize <p(q,xle).  Then q(.)  and x(.)  are  eon-
tinuous and strietly inereasing in e.  Moreover,  q(e)  ---+  Oas e ---+  O J  q(e)  ---+  00 
as e ---+  00 and x(e)  ---+  00 as e ---+  oo. 
Proof:  By strict convexity of <p(')  the values  (q(e),x(e))  are unique.  The 
assumptions on KO  and C(·)  ensure that q(e)  >  O and x(e)  >  Q.  Since 
<p(.)  is  continuous in (q,x,e) for  aH  (q,x,e),  the nmctions q(.)  and x(.)  are 
continuous in e. 
Let (q', x') = argmin <p(q, xlc')  and (q", x") = argmin <p(q, xle"). Then 
l: l:  ,1 +,  K(q') +C(x') + f  ,  1 +,  K(q") +C(x") + f  (13) ue--+  <ue--+  ,
1 + q'  x'  1 + q"  x" 
l:  "  1 +,  K(q") + C(x") + f  l:"  1 +,  K(q') + C(x') + f  ue  +  < ue --+ . 
1 + q"  x"  1 + q'  x' 
Adding these inequalities yields 
(e" - e')  ( 1 +,  _ 1 +')  < O.  (14)
l+q"  l+q' 
Thus e' < c"  implies that q" > ej.  This proves that q(.)  is strictly increasing. 
If  <p(q, x/e)  attains a minimum at (q, x), q and x must satisfy the first order 
condítíons 
be(l +,)x = K'(q)(l + q)2 ,  C'(x)x - C(x) = K(q) +f.  (15)  • 
The l.h.s.  of the second equation is stríctly increasing in x and__the r.h.s.  is 
stríctly íncreasing in  q.  Therefore,  as  q(.)  is  strictly increasing,  also  x (·1  is 
strictly increasing. 
As x(.) is strictly increasing, the first equation in (15) implies that q(e)  ---+ 
O as  e ---+  O and q(e)  ---+  00 as e ---+  oo. The second equation in (15)  therefore 
implies that also x( e)  ---+  00 as e ---+  oo.  Q.E.D. 
Lemma 12  Let (q(c), x(c)) minimize <p(q, x\c).  Then there is a unique esueh 
that q(c)  = ,. MoreoverJ  q(c) <, if  e <eand q(c) >, if e> e 
1￿ 19￿ 
Proof: By Lernma 11, one has q(c) < ,  for  c sl1fficiently small and q(c) > , 
for  c sufficiently  large.  ThllS  by  continllity of  q(.)  there is  a e such  that 
q(c) =,. Uniqueness of eand the second statement follow  fram Lernma 11, . 
as  q(.)  is strictly increasing.  .  Q.E.D. 
Lernrna 13  Let (q(c), x(c))  minimize <p(q, xlc).  Then c(l + ,)/(1 + q(c))  is 
increasing in c. 
Proof: Define z(c) =c(l+,)/(l+q(c)). Then rearranging the first eql.lation 




(16) z e - .  óx(c)  . 
ThllS we have z'(c) > Oif 
[K"(q)(l + q) + K'(q)]q'(c)x > x'(c)K'(q)(l + q).  (17) 
Differentiation of the second equation in (15)  yields 
C"(x)xx'(c) = K'(q)q'(c).  (18) 
Therefore (17)  is eqllivalent to 
[K"(q)(l + q) + K'(q)]C"(x)X
2 > [K'(qW(1 + q).  (19)  Ji 
By assmnption 4 this ineqllality ís certainly satisfied if  ---
)o. 
[K'~~~qr q)  + 1]  [2C'(x)x - 2C(x)] > K'(q)(l + q).  (20) 
'.  Since by (15)  C'(x)x - C(x) = K(q) + j, this inequality is equivalent to 
K'(q)(l + q)  + 1]  > K'(q)(l + q).  (21) [  2K(q)  2[K(q) + j] 
As  j  > O,  (21)  is certainly satisfied, which praves that z'(c) > O.  Q.E.D. 7 
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